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英语翻译In addition,warrants represent a claim on the upper tail

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英语翻译
In addition,warrants represent a claim on the upper tail of the distribution of outcomes,
and convertible securities can be thought of as securities with non–detachable warrants.It seems that the incentive effect of warrants would tend to offset to some extent the incentive effects of the existence of risky debt because the owner–manager would be sharing part of the proceeds associated with a shift in the distribution of returns with the warrant holders.Thus,we conjecture that potential bondholders will find it attractive to have warrants attached to the risky debt of firms in which it is relatively easy to shift the distribution of outcomes to expand the upper tail of the distribution to transfer wealth from bondholders.It would also then be attractive to the owner–manager because of the reduction in the agency costs which he would bear.This argument also
implies that it would make little difference if the warrants were detachable (and therefore saleable
separately from the bonds) since their mere existence would reduce the incentives of the manager
(or stockholders) to increase the riskiness of the firm (and therefore increase the probability of bankruptcy).Furthermore,the addition of a conversion privilege to fixed claims such as debt or preferred stock would also tend to reduce the incentive effects of the existence of such fixed claims and therefore lower the agency costs associated with them.The theory predicts that these phenomena should be more frequently observed in cases where the incentive effects of such fixed claims are high than when they are low.
英语翻译In addition,warrants represent a claim on the upper tail
此外,认股权证代表声称对上的尾巴,分配结果,
及可转换证券可以被看作是证券与非可拆式认股权证.看来,激励效果的认股权证,往往会抵消在一定程度上激励效应所存在的风险债务,因为老板经理人,将分享部分收益与转变,在分配利润与认股证的持有人.因此,我们猜想这一潜力债券持有人会发现它的吸引力,有值得重视的风险债务的公司,它是比较容易转嫁分布成果,以扩大尾巴上的分配财富转移,由债券持有人.它也那么有吸引力车主经理由于减少了代理成本,他会承担.这个论点也
意味着它会取得多大的差别,如果认股权证可分离(因此实用
另外,从债券) ,因为它们仅仅存在会降低奖励的经理人
(或股东) ,以增加风险的公司(以及因此增加的概率破产) .此外,增设了一个转换特权,以固定债权,如债务或优先股而且往往会降低激励效应的存在着这种固定的债权,因此,降低代理成本与他们有联系的.理论预测,这些现象应该更经常看到的情况下,激励效应,这种固定的索赔是高比当他们低.